Counterfeit-electronics custody for DFARS 252.246-7008 and CMMC.
Aeroz binds unit-level identity to each part and writes append-only signed custody that holds across the four-tier prime supply chain — EPCIS-native, defensible at audit.
Counterfeit microelectronics enter multi-tier defense supply chains where oversight is thinnest. Provenance that looks intact at the prime breaks at the handoffs between subtiers.
Remarked, recycled, and cloned components enter through lower tiers. Paperwork follows the part; it does not prove the part itself is genuine.
Each handoff between Tier 1 through Tier 4 is a seam. Provenance reconstructed from disconnected records leaves gaps an adversary can exploit.
DFARS 252.246-7008 demands a traceable, authorized-source chain. Pulling that together after the fact is slow and contestable under audit.
Aeroz gives each part a unit-level chip identity and writes append-only, signed custody for every handoff — engineered to survive all four tiers and map cleanly to DFARS 252.246-7008 and CMMC, on EPCIS 2.0.
Unit-level identity
Signed custody
Four-tier handoffs
A tamper-resistant chip binds an AES-128 identity to the individual part — so authentication checks the component, not just its paperwork.
Every handoff writes a signed event to an append-only ledger — no UPDATE, DELETE, or TRUNCATE for any role, at any tier.
Custody stays continuous from Tier 4 supplier to Tier 1 prime, closing the seams where counterfeit parts enter today.
Custody events are EPCIS 2.0 from the start, so the chain integrates with existing systems and exports cleanly for DFARS and CMMC evidence.
For defense engagements, Aeroz operates the same verification layer under its defense-specific brand. Visit ladefense.us for the defense-focused presentation.
Every tier handoff signed — receiving inspection gets provenance, not paperwork.
Each handoff from Tier 4 to Tier 1 as a signed EPCIS 2.0 event.
A continuous record mapped to DFARS 252.246-7008 traceability expectations.
Armed or breached, per part, the moment tamper-evidence changes.
Scan geography and gaps expose suspect entry points across subtiers.
Unit-level custody evidence for DFARS and CMMC, from the same log in seconds.
A U.S. defense supplier scoped counterfeit-electronics custody with Aeroz across its prime chain: components tagged at the authorized source, every tier handoff signed into the append-only log, and receiving inspection replaced paperwork trust with provenance — the DFARS 252.246-7008 flow-down, made checkable at the bench.
Pilot profile — client details anonymized.
Receiving inspection · provenance, not paperwork
A fixed-fee Aeroz audit produces a written gap analysis against DFARS 252.246-7008 and CMMC, an EPCIS-readiness review of your custody chain, and a scoped remediation plan with cost and timeline.
It is the clause titled “Sources of Electronic Parts,” and it sets an order of preference rather than a single rule. First preference is electronic parts in production by, or in stock from, the original component manufacturer, an authorised aftermarket manufacturer, or suppliers obtaining parts exclusively from those sources. Where parts are not available there, a contractor may use “contractor-approved suppliers” — defined in the clause as a supplier without a contractual agreement with the original component manufacturer that the contractor has identified as trustworthy — provided it applies established counterfeit-prevention industry standards and processes including inspection, testing, and authentication. A part from any other source requires written notice to the Contracting Officer plus inspection, testing, and authentication by the contractor. Paragraph (e) flows the substance of the clause down to subcontracts for electronic parts unless the subcontractor is the original manufacturer.
DFARS 252.246-7007, “Contractor Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System” — a separate clause from 252.246-7008, and the one that carries the reporting duty. It requires reporting to the Contracting Officer and to the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) when the contractor becomes aware of, or has reason to suspect that, an electronic part or an assembly containing electronic parts purchased by the DoD contains counterfeit or suspect counterfeit parts. The clause sets out twelve system criteria the detection and avoidance system must address, among them risk-based tracking of parts from manufacturer to Government acceptance, quarantining of suspect parts, and screening of GIDEP reports. It applies to contractors subject to the Cost Accounting Standards under 41 U.S.C. chapter 15.
Paragraph (c) of 252.246-7008 requires risk-based processes that enable tracking of electronic parts from the original manufacturer to product acceptance. The consequence sits in the same paragraph: where traceability cannot be established, the contractor carries the burden of inspection, testing, and authentication. Records are retained under FAR subpart 4.7 and made available to the Government on request. That burden is the line unit-level identity moves — a part that can prove its own origin does not need to be tested to establish it.
Mostly not, and the exception is the part that matters. Article 1(5) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 excludes batteries incorporated into equipment connected with the protection of Member States’ essential security interests, arms, munitions and war material, and batteries in equipment designed to be sent into space. Article 1(6) disapplies Chapters III and IX to equipment specifically designed for the safety of nuclear installations. But that arms exclusion is written so as not to reach non-military products — so a defence contractor’s commercial and dual-use lines stay in scope, and from 18 February 2027 those batteries require the QR code and battery passport under Article 77. The useful question is never “are we a defence supplier?” but “which of our lines are actually military?”
Yes. The custody record is append-only and cryptographically signed at each transfer, so it persists intact as a part moves from the prime through subcontractor tiers down to component suppliers. Because the record is EPCIS-native, every tier writes to the same standardised custody log and no handoff breaks the chain of provenance.
Yes. Aeroz is EPCIS-native and uses GS1 standards, so it interoperates with existing ERP, PLM and supply-chain systems rather than replacing them. It adds a unit-level authentication and custody layer on top of the infrastructure contractors already run, which keeps integration effort low and avoids rip-and-replace.
Clause text checked against eCFR 48 CFR 252.246-7007 and 252.246-7008, and Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 as consolidated 18 July 2024. Verified 19 September 2026.
